The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially-Driven Purposes by Conaway, Ann E.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 2 Article 1
2012
The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability
Company for Socially-Driven Purposes
Ann E. Conaway
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Conaway, Ann E. (2012) "The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially-Driven Purposes," William Mitchell
Law Review: Vol. 38: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/1
  
 
772 
THE GLOBAL USE OF THE DELAWARE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY FOR SOCIALLY-DRIVEN 
PURPOSES 
Ann E. Conaway† 
 I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 773 
 II. INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL CHOICE OF ENTITY FOR 
SOCIALLY-DRIVEN BUSINESSES ............................................... 780 
 III. CHOICE OF ENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED 
KINGDOM FOR SOCIALLY-DRIVEN BUSINESSES ....................... 784 
A.  The United Kingdom Limited Liability Partnership............ 784 
1. General Background .................................................... 784 
2. Formation ................................................................... 786 
3. The Partnership AgreementTailoring the Investment .. 787 
B.  The United Kingdom “Private Company” .......................... 790 
1. General Introduction—The Memorandum of 
Association .................................................................. 790 
2. The Articles of Association—Tailoring the Investment ... 792 
3. The Limited Company—Reflections for Social 
Responsibility .............................................................. 795 
C. The B or Beneficial Corporation ......................................... 796 
1. General Introduction ................................................... 796 
2. Formation and Management ........................................ 797 
3. Certification ................................................................ 799 
4. The Truth About Benefit Corporations .......................... 800 
D. The “L3C” or Low-Profit Limited Liability Company .......... 802 
1. General Background .................................................... 802 
2. The Vermont Act .......................................................... 803 
3. The Truth About L3C Legislation ................................ 804 
4. The Problem with Statutory Fiduciary Duties ................. 805 
E.  The Delaware Limited Liability Company (LLC) ............... 806 
1. General Background and History ................................. 806 
2. Formation and Tailoring the Business .......................... 809 
 
       †  Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, Wilmington, 
Delaware.   
1
Conaway: The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Soci
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
2012] GLOBAL USE OF THE DELAWARE LLC 773 
3. Management of the Delaware LLC ............................... 811 
4. The Delaware LLC—The Ultimate in Entity Efficiency 
and Investor Flexibility ................................................. 812 
 VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 814 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s global economy, more businesses are focusing on 
giving back to the world community1; minimizing carbon 
footprints2; maximizing renewable energy3; engaging in beneficial 
 
 1. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is one such organization.  See THE 
BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Pages/home 
.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).   
The Grand Challenges in Global Health initiative is focused on engaging 
creative minds to work on scientific and technological breakthroughs for 
the world’s most pressing health problems.  Grand Challenges 
Explorations is a grant program within the initiative that fosters 
innovative, early-stage research to expand the pipeline of ideas that can 
lead to those much needed global health and development solutions.  
Grand Challenges in Global Health, THE BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/global-health/Pages/grand-challenges-
explorations.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  One of the new Grand Challenges in 
Global Health initiatives that won additional funding is in Tanzania.  IFAKARA 
Health Institute, THE BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation 
.org/Grants-2009/Pages/IFAKARA-Health-Institute-OPP53214.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2011).  This project is testing “placement of outdoor decoy sites that attract 
and trap breeding, resting and feeding mosquitoes for their ability to reduce 
malaria transmission in rural communities.”  Ling Wong, Can Bacteria Protect 
Against HIV? Grand Challenges Explorations Grants Help Ask the Question, IMPATIENT 
OPTIMISTS (July 13, 2011), http://www.impatientoptimists.org/Posts/2011/07 
/Can-Bacteria-Protect-Against-HIV-Grand-Challenges-Explorations-Grants-Help-
Ask-the-Question.  This statement by Bill Gates best reflects the vision of the Gates 
Foundation: “I believe that risk-taking is essential if we are to achieve truly 
transformative health technologies.”  Bill Gates, Discovery Science—Taking the 
Challenge, THE GATESNOTES (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.thegatesnotes.com 
/Topics/Health/Discovery-Science-Taking-the-Challenge.  
 2. See Green Directory, CLIMATE ACTION PROGRAMME, 
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/green_directory/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2011), for descriptions of programs being instituted around the world to reduce 
carbon footprints through renewable energy sources. 
 3. In the United Kingdom, Scotland presently leads with offshore wind, 
onshore wind, wave, and tidal energy as part of their package of renewable energy 
sources.  Marine, SCOTTISH RENEWABLES, http://www.scottishrenewables.com 
/technologies/marine/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011); Offshore Wind, SCOTTISH 
RENEWABLES, http://www.scottishrenewables.com/technologies/offshore-wind/ 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2011); Onshore Wind, SCOTTISH RENEWABLES, 
http://www.scottishrenewables.com/technologies/onshore-wInd/ (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2011).  Because the territorial waters off England, Wales, Scotland, and 
2
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social purposes,4 such as aiding homeless veterans, those who are 
mentally disabled or ill, are former convicts, or are elderly and in 
 
Ireland belong to the British Crown, all offshore wind, wave, and tidal renewable 
technologies must be developed in tandem with the “Crown Estate,” which is a 
statutory corporation in England.  Offshore Wind Energy, THE CROWN ESTATE, 
http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/offshore_wind_energy (last visited Oct. 6, 
2011); Wave and Tidal, THE CROWN ESTATE, http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk 
/energy/wave-and-tidal (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  Scotland likely will be seeking a 
vote for independence within the next two years because of the Crown Estate in 
order to be able to retain the revenues generated by Scottish renewable 
technologies.  Simon Johnson, David Cameron and Alex Salmond at Loggerheads Over 
Scottish Independence Vote, THE TELEGRAPH (May 9, 2011, 7:00 AM BST), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/scottish-politics/8501020 
/David-Cameron-and-Alex-Salmond-at-loggerheads-over-Scottish-independence-
vote.html.  A possible alternative to a vote for independence might be the 
devolvement of the Crown Estate to each of the revenue-generating countries.  
Salmond Calls to Devolution of the Crown Estate, FISHNEWSEU.COM (June 22, 2011, 10:42 
AM), http://www.fishnewseu.com/latest-news/scottish/6045-salmondalls-for-
devolution-of-the-crown-estate.html.  Northern Ireland is also being developed as a 
productive source of wind and wave energy.  Jessica Shankleman, Crown Estate to 
Kick Off Northern Irish Offshore Renewables Leasing Round, BUS. GREEN (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2032033/crown-estate-kick-northern-
irish-offshore-renewables-leasing-round.  
 4. Social Enterprise Alliance (SEA), www.se-alliance.org, is a membership 
organization comprised of approximately 700 members in the United States and 
Canada that brings together nonprofits, venture capitalists, corporations, and 
service providers for the purpose of “actively building the field of social enterprise 
through networking opportunities, educational forums, strategic partnerships, and 
impact legislation.”  About Us, SOC. ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.se-
alliance.org/about (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  SEA has defined a “social 
enterprise” as “an organization or venture that achieves its primary social or 
environmental mission using business methods.”  What is Social Enterprise?, SOC. 
ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2011). 
A “social enterprise” differs from a “socially responsible” organization in two ways:  
  Social enterprises directly address social needs through their products 
and services or through the numbers of disadvantaged people they 
employ.  This distinguishes them from “socially responsible businesses,” 
which create positive social change indirectly through the practice of 
corporate social responsibility (e.g., creating and implementing a 
philanthropic foundation; paying equitable wages to their employees; 
using environmentally friendly raw materials; providing volunteers to 
help with community projects). 
  Social enterprises use earned revenue strategies to pursue a double or 
triple bottom line, either alone (as a social sector business, in either the 
private or the nonprofit sector) or as a significant part of a nonprofit’s 
mixed revenue stream that also includes charitable contributions and 
public sector subsidies.  This distinguishes them from traditional 
nonprofits, which rely primarily on philanthropic and government 
support. 
Id. 
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need of palliative care; granting financial aid to patients for cancer 
treatments5; providing low-income, low-energy housing;6 giving aid 
to victims of tsunamis and nuclear disasters;7 and donating to areas 
hit by freak storms and other weather conditions,8 or to 
communities decimated by civil war and newly overthrown rulers.9  
In each of these cases, businesses and individuals are themselves 
donating or investing in organizations that are reaching out to 
“give back” to a targeted group of people or to a cause or to 
otherwise engage in a socially-driven or beneficial purpose.  
In the United States and the United Kingdom, local and 
national governments have initiated measures to reduce 
dependence on fossil fuels and to switch to renewable energy 
sources.10  In the United States, solar energy is well developed.11  
 
 5. See Resources for Financial Assistance for Patients and Their Families, NAT’L 
CANCER INST., https://cissecure.nci.nih.gov/factsheet/FactSheetSearch8_3.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011), for a site with a U.S. database of government and 
nonprofit organizations that provide aid for cancer patients who either have no 
health insurance or who need financial help notwithstanding the presence of 
health insurance. 
 6. The Office of Community Service offers low-energy, low-income housing 
as well as many other specialized programs directed toward the healthy 
maintenance of the family.  See Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program 
(LIHEAP), ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/liheap/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 7. University students at Brandeis worked with the Red Cross to raise funds 
to send aid to victims of Japan’s tsunami and resulting nuclear disaster.  Susan 
Chaityn Lebovits, Japan Relief Fundraising Aiding Victims of Disaster, BRANDEISNOW 
(Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2011/april/japan.html.  
 8. In response to the Joplin, Missouri disaster, an individual businessman 
began selling t-shirts with a picture of Uncle Sam stating: “America Lends a Hand.”  
Proceeds from the sales were sent to the Joplin area, as well as North Dakota.  
Westporter’s T-Shirt Sales to Aid Midwest Disaster Victims, WESTPORT NEWS (July 21, 
2011, 4:21 PM), http://www.westport-news.com/news/article/Westporter-s-T-
shirt-sales-to-aid-Midwest-1527924.php.  
 9. For example, in Yemen, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
continued to provide food and medical aid to the people of Yemen during its civil 
war. Yemen-Complex Emergency, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/co
untries/yemen/template/fs_sr/fy2011/yemen_ce_fs02_03-17-2011.pdf. 
 10. In the United States, twenty-nine states have initiated measures to reduce 
reliance on fossil fuels in favor of renewable energy sources.  See State-Federal RPS 
Collaborative, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE, http://www.cleanenergystates.org 
/projects/state-federal-rps-collaborative/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  Depending 
upon the geographic region, each state’s reason for implementing “green” 
initiatives may differ.  For example, coastal states are concerned with global 
warming and rising tides.  Western states are more concerned with long droughts.  
Midwestern states fear impact on agriculture, whereas other states consider 
“green” directives to be job enhancers.   
4
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Wind energy is a growing renewable resource in the United States 
with onshore and offshore sites in place in the West and other 
offshore sites being built along the East Coast.12  Wave energy is less 
 
  In the United Kingdom, England has already, through the Crown Estate, 
implemented offshore wind turbines.  See Offshore Wind Energy, THE CROWN ESTATE, 
http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/offshore_wind_energy (last visited Oct. 6, 
2011).  The Crown Estate also operates wind, wave, and tidal turbines in Scottish 
and Northern Irish territorial waters through bidding developers.  See id.  All 
revenues from offshore facilities in Scottish and Northern Irish territorial waters 
pass to the Crown Estate in the United Kingdom.  Scottish Government Criticizes 
Crown Estate’s Plans for Coastal Communities Fund, OFFSHOREWIND.BIZ (July 25, 
2011), http://www.offshorewind.biz/2011/07/25/scottish-government-criticizes-
crown-estates-plans-for-coastal-communities-fund/. 
 11. For example, the DuPont Company is now actively involved in the solar 
energy field with the purchase of Innovalight.  DuPont Snaps up Innovalight in Solar 
Push, BUS. GREEN (July 26, 2011), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news 
/2096739/dupont-snaps-innovalight-solar-push.  United States solar energy is 
generally positioned in California, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida, as well as other 
states.  LARRY SHERWOOD, U.S. SOLAR MARKET TRENDS 8–11 (2011), available at 
http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IREC-Solar-Market-Trends-
Report-June-2011-web.pdf.  In general, solar energy can be set up anywhere; 
however, the issue is one of “tying in” to an existing grid, which is a costly 
endeavor in many circumstances.  See Grid Integration for Systems Integration, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY (July 30, 2010), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/grid 
_integration.html.  
 12. See Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, 
http://www.awea.org/learnabout/industry_stats/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 
2011).  Today, the United States generates 42,432 megawatts (MW) of cumulative 
installed capacity of wind power, making it the second largest generator of wind 
energy—second only to China.  See id.  Texas leads the country in the generation 
of wind energy, largely through the Roscoe Wind Farm as well as many other wind 
farms located throughout the state.  See, e.g., Eileen O’Grady, E.ON Completes 
World’s Largest Wind Farm in Texas, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2009, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/01/wind-texas-
idUSN3023624320091001 (naming Texas as the leading state for wind capacity 
and discussing the completion of Roscoe Wind Farm).  The U.S. Department of 
Energy issued its 20% Wind Energy By 2030, predicting that twenty percent of U.S. 
electricity will be produced by wind, with four percent of that being generated by 
offshore wind.  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, at 10 (2008), 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41869.pdf. 
  In Delaware, Bluewater Wind LLC contracted to set up the first wind 
turbines off Fenwick Island where winds are steady and the coastal shelf is 
relatively shallow, making maintenance easier and less costly.  Mark Svenvold, 
Wind-Power Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008 
/09/14/magazine/14wind-t.html?pagewanted=all.  However, in 2008 when the 
economy turned, the loans that guaranteed the wind project were withdrawn.  Id.  
Presently, Senators Tom Carper of Delaware and Olympia Snowe of Maine have 
offered legislation that would offer tax incentives for investors in projects like 
Bluewater Wind.  Press Release, Sen. Tom Carper, Sens. Carper, Snowe Introduce 
Bill to Encourage Offshore Wind Energy Production (July 21, 2011), available at 
http://carper.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=fdef0fd4-8302-488e-
5
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developed in the United States but does exist, particularly along 
the Oregon coast.13  Underwater turbines are currently being tested 
in the Mississippi and East Rivers in the United States.14  
Scotland and Northern Ireland are far ahead of the United 
States in the renewable energies of wind and wave technologies.15  
However, one difficulty that Scotland and Ireland face in 
benefitting directly from their renewable energy efforts is that the 
Crown Estate claims all revenues from offshore wind and wave 
facilities in Scotland and Northern Ireland.16 
Yet, what each of these renewable energy undertakings has in 
common is a “beneficial” purpose.  In the past, for-benefit entities 
in the United States were generally organized as nonprofit 
corporations.17  The same choice is available in the United 
Kingdom, but the entity’s purpose is traditionally limited to 
charities.18  However, a true nonprofit entity does not allow an 
 
aae6-4caf97975ba1.  
 13. Tracy Loew, Oregon is First U.S. Site for a Wave-Power Farm, USA TODAY (Feb. 
17, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/environment 
/2010-02-16-wave-energy_N.htm.  Wave energy in the United States has generally 
been met with skepticism due to the erratic nature of waves and concern for the 
aquatic environment.  See id.  One wave site was established off the coast of Oregon 
over two years ago but it sank.  Id.  Now another is in place but the costs are five to 
six times that of wind energy.  Id. 
 14. Peter Fairley, Tidal Turbines Help Light Up Manhattan, TECH. REV. (Apr. 23, 
2007), http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/18567/?mod=related; Phil 
McKenna, Turbines Could Tap the Mississippi’s Power, TECH. REV. (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/26679/. 
 15. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 16. See Offshore Wind Energy, THE CROWN ESTATE, http://www.thecrownestate 
.co.uk/offshore_wind_energy (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  One proposal by the 
United Kingdom is that fifty percent of Scottish revenues from offshore 
technologies would be returned to the Crown Estate.  Scottish Government Criticizes 
Crown Estate’s Plans for Coastal Communities Fund, OFFSHOREWIND.BIZ (July 25, 
2011), http://www.offshorewind.biz/2011/07/25/scottish-government-criticizes-
crown-estates-plans-for-coastal-communities-fund/.  Scottish Ministers, however, 
seek full devolution of Scottish territorial waters.  Id.  For a dialogue between 
Professor Conaway and Scottish practitioners, see LINKEDIN correspondence from 
Professor Conaway to Scottish Renewable Energy (on file with author), available at 
http://www.linkedin.com/groupAnswers?viewQuestionAndAnswers=&discussionI
D=61630111&gid=1795794&trk=eml-anet_dig-b_pd-pmr-cn. 
 17. A nonprofit corporation is organized as a corporation, but its “members” 
do not receive distributions as stockholders as in for-profit corporations.  Cf. I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2006) (explaining that no part of a nonprofit’s net earnings benefit 
private shareholders).  For U.S. tax regulations and exemptions governing 
organizations see id. §§ 501–515. 
 18. Under English Companies Law, a not-for-profit entity could be organized 
as a company limited by guarantee if it states a beneficial purpose under the 
Statute of Elizabeth and prohibits any distributions to shareholders/members.  
6
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investor to receive any return on his or her investment.  For 
example, all “profits” are redistributed to the entity and not to its 
members or investors.19 
In the present economy, entrepreneurs increasingly wish to 
invest capital in socially responsible businesses and to receive an 
internal return—a true admixture of profit and “social benefit.”  In 
addition, these “social entrepreneurs” increasingly seek capital 
from private investors or foundations with “program related 
investments,” or “PRIs,” that include low-interest loans or loan 
guarantees to nonprofit charities or organizations engaged in 
socially beneficial efforts.20  Examples of hybrid organizations 
blending profit with “benefit” in the United States include the B, or 
Benefit, Corporation21 and the L3C.22  Each of these hybrid entities 
 
Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/1985/6/contents.  A corporation is formed when two or more persons 
subscribe their names to a memorandum of association that is then registered at 
Companies House.  See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 7 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.  Under the Twelfth EC 
Companies Law Directive, a single person may subscribe to the memorandum of 
association if the company is to be a single member private limited company.  As 
of 2008, a charitable organization in England may also be organized as an 
unincorporated association, a trust, or a corporation by Royal Charter.  Charities 
Act, 2006, c. 50, §§ 31–34 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga 
/2006/50/contents.  A “charitable purpose” is defined fifteen ways under the 
Charities Act of 2006.  Id. § 2. 
 19. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 20. Julia Vail, Program-related Investments Provide Needed Relief, PHILANTHROPY J. 
(Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.philanthropyjournal.org/resources/special-
reports/finance-accounting/program-related-investments-provide-needed-relief.  
PRIs were primarily jump-started by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Ford 
Foundation.  Id.  The Foundation Center reports that in 2009 $50,000 was granted 
to the Sierra Club in California to study methods of saving energy by studying 
building codes.  Global Philanthropy, FOUND. CTR., http://foundationcenter.org 
/gpf/climatechange/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  The PRI grant for the Sierra Club 
came from the George Gund Foundation.  Id.  The only other “renewable energy” 
grants reported by the Foundation Center were for $600,000 in 2007 by the W.K. 
Kellogg Foundation to ZERO Regional Environment Organisation for solar and 
wind powered water systems in Zimbabwe and $100,000 in 2010 from the Ford 
Foundation to FIS Social Company, SA to develop an innovative business model 
for distributing sustainable solar panels to poor rural families in Peru and 
Argentina.  Id.  Other general grants were made to study climate changes, but no 
others were made on the specific issue of renewable energy sources or technology 
in the United States.  Id. 
 21. See Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom of 
Contract in Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789 (2008) [hereinafter Lessons to be Learned] 
(discussing in depth the advent of the B Corporation in the context of “freedom 
to contract” in favor of “other constituencies” in a corporation’s life). 
7
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carries significant pre-packaged disadvantages.23 
In the United Kingdom, the limited company may provide for-
benefit and for-profit services since the company exists for whatever 
“purposes” are set forth in the articles of association.  The fiduciary 
duties of the directors are thereafter linked to the “purposes” of the 
company even if those purposes seem to be in conflict with one 
another.  The limited company is currently regulated by the 
Companies Act of 1985 (1989), the Insolvency Act of 1986, the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, the Business 
Names Act of 1985, the Financial Services Act of 1986, and the 
Income and Corporations Taxes Act of 1988.24  In the United 
Kingdom, however, the organization that is being used by an 
 
 22. The L3C is a low-profit limited liability company that has a primary social 
purpose and a secondary profit purpose.  Id. at 792 n.10.  The first state to enact 
the L3C was Vermont.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2010).  Other states with 
L3C legislation include Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, 
Utah, Wyoming, The Crow Indian Nation of Montana, and The Oglala Sioux 
Tribe.  See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1–26 (West Supp. 2010); H.R. 1421, 2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess., 2010 La. Acts 417; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, §§ 1599, 1611 (2010); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS  SERV. § 450.4102(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); Act of Aug. 3, 
2010, S. 308, 2009 Sess. (N.C. 2009), http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2009 
/Bills/Senate/PDF/S308v5.pdf; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48–2c–412 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2010), repealed by Unincorporated Business Entity Uniform Acts of 2011, S.B. 131, 
2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17–15–102(a)(ix) (2009) 
(repealed 2010); L3C Information, RURAL DYNAMICS INC.COM (Jan. 14, 2009, 11:54 
AM), http://www.ruraldynamics.org/l3c-information (discussing Crow Indian 
Nation’s passing of L3C legislation); Low-profit Limited Liability Companies (L3Cs), 
LAWFORCHANGE,  http://www.lawforchange.org/lfc/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW 
&ID=3869&SnID=2 (last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (discussing the Ogala Sioux Tribe’s 
adoption of L3C legislation).  By enacting legislation at the state level, jurisdictions 
with the L3C create a hybrid organization that allows entrepreneurs to invest in a 
hybrid entity that can receive “program related investment” income from 
investment firms without adhering to rigid nonprofit tax regulation.  See Lessons to 
be Learned, supra note 21, at 792 n.10, 801 n.36.  
 23. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation 
Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274 (2010) (“[W]ithout 
changes to federal PRI [‘program-related investment’ provisions for private 
foundations] rules, the L3C construct has little or no value.  Indeed, the existence 
of the state law form, without matching federal income tax substance, is dangerous 
since the ill-advised may assume value and use the form.”).  
 24. See Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, §§ 72–76, 78–79 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/40/contents (detailing the regulation 
in which limited companies are subject to the Financial Services Act in sections 
72–76, Insolvency Act section 78, and Company Directors Qualification Act section 
79); Incomes and Corporations Tax Act, 1988, c. 1, § 6. (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/contents/enacted; Business Names 
Act, 1985, c. 7, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985 
/7/contents. 
8
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increasing number of developers in the renewable energy sector is 
the limited liability partnership, or “LLP.”  Yet, the United 
Kingdom LLP functions in many ways like the limited company, 
including mandatory compliance with inflexible filing rules, 
internal managerial regulations, public listing of members’ or 
owners’ names, required presence of auditors and auditing 
procedures, compliance with insolvency regulations, and 
application of the Company Directors Disqualifications Act 1986.25  
In the United States, the preeminent solution is the flexible, 
contractually based Delaware limited liability company, or “LLC.”  
The thesis of this article is that, presently, the Delaware LLC 
provides global investors maximum internal efficiency, as well as 
asset protection at a decreased agency cost, for businesses 
operating solely within or outside the United States for socially-
driven enterprises.  The Delaware LLC offers contractual freedom 
to investors, managers, owners, funds, and foundations to structure 
a for-benefit, for-profit socially responsible business plan with 
limited liability for owners and investors, including maximum tax 
efficiencies within the United States or the United Kingdom due to 
its completely mobile, contractual character. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL CHOICE OF ENTITY FOR SOCIALLY-
DRIVEN BUSINESSES 
Today, a host of entities masquerade as for-benefit 
organizations.  The best known of these entities is the nonprofit 
corporation.  Yet, because the nonprofit corporation is driven by a 
mandatory corporate infrastructure—non-distribution of profits to 
equity holders and compliance with Internal Revenue Code 
regulations—the nonprofit corporation is inflexible in today’s 
demanding marketplace for investors who want a return on their 
investment.  
Another new “benefit” corporation being touted by B Lab is 
the “Benefit Corporation,” otherwise known as the B Corporation.26  
 
 25. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents; Limited Liability 
Partnerships Regulations, 2001, S.I. 2001/1090, art. 3 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/1090/contents/made (adopting the full 
text of the Companies Act 1985 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986, virtually unmodified).  
 26. About Certified B Corps, B LABS, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2011).  
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Unlike the nonprofit corporation, the B Corporation is a for-
benefit/for-profit corporation that permits its owners to invest in a 
socially-driven-purpose organization and to benefit financially at 
the same time.27  A B Corporation must, however, amend its 
certificate of incorporation to become a valid B Corporation.28  The 
B Corporation must also be “certified” by meeting specific B Lab 
standards in order to carry the moniker of B Corporation.29  
Inherent contractual and fiduciary conflicts arise under the 
governance paradigm of the B Corporation without statutory 
clarification since the B Corporation permits profit maximization 
to shareholders in para passu with the maximization of 
environmental, consumer, and community benefits.30  Proponents 
of the B Corporation rely on “constituency” statutes as a 
fundamental basis for the conflicted dual-purpose B entity.31 
 
 27. See Celia R. Taylor, Berle and Social Businesses: A Consideration, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1501, 1513 (2011) (“B Corporations agree to engage in ‘triple bottom 
line’ accounting, focusing on social, environmental, and economic returns.”).   
 28. See id. (“To gain the ‘B Corporation’ designation (granted by B Lab), a 
corporation must . . . amend its articles of incorporation to state explicitly that 
managers must consider the interests of employees, the community, and the 
environment.”). 
 29.  See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 793 n.12.   
 30. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 1516 (“B Corporation directors may decide 
not to take a particular action that would be profit-maximizing because they 
conclude that it would harm the environment (thereby doing no harm), but they 
still must be concerned that their actions ultimately redound to the benefit of 
their shareholders.”). 
 31. Several jurisdictions have constituency statutes.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-1202(A) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2010); FLA. STAT. § 
607.0830(3) (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221(b) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-
1-602 (2010); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2011); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (2010); 
IOWA CODE § 490.1108A (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 2010); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 831(6) (2011); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 156B, § 65 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2010); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 21-2045(1) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
53-11-35D (2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2010); 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 1715(a), 1716(a) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (2010); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2011); WIS. 
STAT. § 180.0827 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2011). 
  Generally, the constituency statutes exist as amendments to statutory 
statements as to directorial duties of care.  See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 
794 n.16.  In a typical case, constituency acts provide that in satisfying managerial 
duties of care, directors may consider the interests of “stakeholders” such as 
employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the community at large.  Id.  
Because these acts were born out of the hostile takeover era of the 1980s and 
1990s, many of the acts were originally triggered upon a change in control.  
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/1
  
782 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2 
Additionally, a highly criticized for-benefit/for-profit entity is 
the L3C.  The L3C is technically a hybrid entity that is organized as 
a low-profit entity but with a social purpose.32  The L3C, from a tax 
perspective, will generally permit income and expenses to “flow 
through” to members.33  However, tax-exempt members must 
consider the impact of any unrelated business income.34  The L3C 
is organized as any other LLC and thus may be: (1) member-
managed; (2) manager-managed; or (3) managed by a board of 
managers.35  The rights and duties of the members and managers 
will be set forth in the L3C Certificate of Formation and Operating 
Agreement.36  The capital structure of the L3C is typically designed 
to permit tax-exempt, program-related investments by private 
foundations as well as for-profit sources.37  Distributions to 
members are made in accordance with the terms of the Operating 
Agreement of the L3C.38  The confusion arising from the L3C is 
that the exact same capital, managerial, and profit/benefit 
 
Today, however, most of the constituency acts do not operate solely within the 
context of hostile acquisitions (only Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee limit their constituency acts to corporate 
acquisitions), and only Connecticut requires consideration of constituent 
interests—all other “stakeholder” acts are permissive only.  Id.   
  Given the history underlying these acts, and the permissive nature of their 
reach, it is difficult to imagine how a B Corporation could legally “expand” the 
scope of directorial duties owed to stockholders and the common law on this issue 
based upon these acts.  Id.  The legal argument seems tenuous at best. 
 32. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 792 n.10. 
 33. See infra Part III.D. 
 34. The IRS has not ruled that an investment in an L3C will necessarily 
qualify as a program-related investment (PRI).  The IRS has issued private letter 
rulings permitting PRIs that were set up as LLC investments.  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 2006-03-031 (Oct. 25, 2005) (finding that a private foundation that invested 
in a private for-profit pharmaceutical company organized to help solve global 
health issues was a tax-exempt investment under Internal Revenue Code section 
4942(g) (2007)); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020 (Dec. 13, 2005) (finding 
that a private foundation’s contributions to an LLC formed to invest in low-
income communities qualified as a PRI under Internal Revenue Code section 
4944(c) (2006)).  In each of these cases, LLCs were the entities of choice, not 
L3Cs. 
 35. See infra Part III.D. 
 36. Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 287–88 (explaining that an L3C 
Operating Agreement can establish fiduciary duties). 
 37. See id. at 273 (“The result was intended to . . . allow[] private foundation 
money to flow more efficiently and in greater quantity into profit-making 
ventures.”). 
 38. Id. at 287 (“[T]he operating agreement can . . . establish fiduciary rules 
governing members and managers.”). 
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purposes can be achieved by an LLC without an L3C designation.39  
Yet, the proponents of L3C legislation argue that the primary focus 
of “benefit,” rather than profit, warrants the necessity of new 
legislation.40  This justification by L3C proponents is nonsensical 
considering the flexibility of today’s Delaware LLC, along with its 
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
unprecedented learning curve in regards to their knowledge and 
appreciation of the standard and sophisticated contractual LLC. 
The English LLP, though currently available in England and 
Scotland, is not a legislative choice for Irish investors.  In addition, 
the English LLP requires for its existence at least two owners.41  The 
Scottish LLP also mandates two owners and thus immediately 
extinguishes any use of the Scottish LLP as a special purpose 
entity.42  The English LLP also shares many required inflexible 
corporate characteristics, including publication of members’ names 
despite lack of personal liability, mandatory auditor presence and 
auditor filings, and compliance with the Insolvency Act of 1986 and 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, even where 
directors are not present in the entity.43 
Finally, the United Kingdom limited company is available for a 
renewable energy technology company that combines beneficial 
and economic purposes.  To achieve this cooperative financial 
effort, the memorandum of association (or the articles of 
association under the reforms of the Companies Act 2006) of the 
limited company will set forth in great detail the purposes and 
 
 39. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 
35 VT. L. REV. 105, 109 (2010) (“The L3C adopts the LLC governance framework 
with virtually no changes.”). 
 40. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 273 (discussing the process 
through which proponents of L3C legislation advocated for the legislation). 
 41. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2(1)(a) (U.K.), available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents. 
 42. See id. § 2(2)(c); see also Limited Liability Partnerships (Scotland) 
Regulations, 2001, S.I. 2001/128, § 3(b), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ssi/2001/128/pdfs/ssi_20010128_en.pdf (incorporating the Limited Liability 
Partnerships Act, 2000, into the Scottish LLP regulations). 
 43. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2(2)(e)–(f) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents (stating that 
all members, both designated and non-designated, must include their names on 
the incorporation document); Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations, 2001, 
S.I. 1090, § 3 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/1090 
/contents/made (incorporating the Accounts and Audit provision of Part VII of 
the Companies Act, 1985, into the English LLP regulations); id. at § 4(2) 
(incorporating the Company Director Disqualification Act 1986 and the 
Insolvency Act 1986 into the English LLP regulations).  
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objectives of the limited company, including the procedures that 
management is to follow in carrying out company objectives.44  
Thereafter, the fiduciary duties owed by managers will track the 
detailed statement of purposes and objectives published in the 
memorandum of association or articles of association as registered 
in the Companies House.45  It is left to the managers of the limited 
company to sort and implement the fiduciary duties to the 
company according to their best efforts and without engaging in 
competition with the company.46 
The most flexible contractual entity presently available in the 
global marketplace is the Delaware limited liability company.  The 
Delaware LLC begins with the significant advantage of operating 
under a state policy of “freedom of contract” and “[maximum] 
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”47  Freedom 
of contract grants investors in a Delaware LLC the ability to 
structure operating agreements according to the sophistication of 
the parties and the nature of the business.  In this sense, a Delaware 
LLC would permit the creation of a for-benefit, for-profit entity 
without any special designation and could also eliminate duties or 
liabilities for breach of duties between contradictory financial 
interests. 
III. CHOICE OF ENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED 
KINGDOM FOR SOCIALLY-DRIVEN BUSINESSES 
A. The United Kingdom Limited Liability Partnership 
1. General Background 
The LLP in England, Wales, and Scotland received Royal 
Assent for “incorporation” by any two or more persons who wish to 
 
 44. See infra Part III.B. 
 45. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 171 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents (“A director of a 
company must—(a) act only in accordance with the company’s constitution, and 
(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they were conferred.”).  See 
generally Gordon L. Clark & Eric R. W. Knight, Implications of the UK Companies Act 
2006 for Institutional Investors and the Market for Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 259 (2009). 
 46. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents. 
 47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2010). 
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go into business together on July 20, 2000.48  The effective date for 
the United Kingdom LLP Act was April 6, 2001.49 
The United Kingdom LLP combines the organizational 
flexibility and pass-through default tax status of a partnership, but 
unlike its American counterpart, imposes “corporate” filing 
requirements, mandatory auditing procedures, statutory insolvency 
mandates, and adherence to the Company Directors 
Disqualifications Act.  The “owners” in a United Kingdom LLP are 
“members” rather than “partners.”50  In England and Wales, 
partners in a partnership have joint liability for partnership 
obligations and debts, as do partners in a United States partnership 
governed by the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914.51  Those same 
partners have joint and several liability for losses or damages 
resulting from conduct occurring in the ordinary course of the 
partnership business or with the consent of the partners inasmuch 
as the partnership is not an entity.52  Scotland, however, adopted 
independent partnership legislation in 2001—following the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994—that imposes joint and 
several liability on all partners for contract and tort liabilities of the 
partnership.53 
Because of the growth of professional partnerships in the 
United Kingdom and the potential for a “doomsday” claim—a 
 
 48. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, Introduction (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents. 
 49. The Act came into legal effect on April 6, 2001 by virtue of the Limited 
Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (Commencement) Order 2000.  Limited Liability 
Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/2000/12/contents. 
 50. In the use of the term “members” for the “owners” of the U.K. LLP, 
England, Scotland, and Wales have created an entity that more resembles the 
original U.S. two-member LLC for professionals—with the exception of the U.K. 
“transparency” requirements for public posting of members’ names, mandatory 
auditing procedures, and other corporate regulations. 
 51. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 9 (1890) (U.K.), available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/53-54/39/contents; UNIF. P’SHIP 
ACT (1914) § 15, 1 U.L.A. 117 (2001). 
 52. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 9 (1890) (U.K.), available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/53-54/39/contents; UNIF. P’SHIP 
ACT (1914) § 15, 1 U.L.A. 117 (2001).  A partnership is formed by the mere 
association of two or more persons to participate in the control of a business for 
profit.  See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) § 202, 1 U.L.A. 92 (2001) (“[T]he 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit 
forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”). 
 53. See The Limited Liability Partnerships (Scotland) Regulations, 2001, S.I. 
2001/128, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2001/128/pdfs/ssi 
_20010128_en.pdf. 
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claim against the personal assets of a partner for actions of an 
unknown partner who may be located in another part of the 
country or even outside the country and where the claim exceeds 
the assets of the partnership or the firm’s insurance coverage—
England, Wales, and Scotland adopted the LLP primarily for 
professionals since these persons cannot escape their general duty 
of care to their clients for ordinary negligence.54  With these 
parameters in mind, the United Kingdom LLP allows members to 
enjoy protection from personal liability for contractual obligations 
of the partnership as well as torts committed by a wrongdoing 
partner acting in the ordinary course of the partnership.55  In this 
sense, the United Kingdom LLP is a legal entity separate from its 
members and is deemed to be a “body corporate.”56 
2. Formation 
To “incorporate” an LLP in the United Kingdom, a name must 
be checked against the index of names maintained by the Registrar 
of Companies according to the Companies Act of 1985.57  A 
founder has no procedure to “register” a name in advance of 
formation of the LLP, but does have the obligation to examine the 
records at Companies House, to ensure that the LLP does not have 
a name that is “the same as” or “too like” an existing name shown 
 
 54. “The only option for many professions, in the past, was to operate as 
partnerships. . . . The fact that professional bodies were required to operate as 
partnerships meant that they were subject to the particular rules relating to the 
liability of partners.”  Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, n.7 (U.K), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/notes/division/3. 
 55. Id. § 1(5) (“[E]xcept as far as otherwise provided by this Act or any other 
enactment, the law relating to partnerships does not apply to a limited liability 
partnership.”). 
 56. “A limited liability partnership is a body corporate (with legal personality 
separate from that of its members) which is formed by being incorporated under this Act . . . .”  
Id.  § 1(2) (emphasis added). 
 57. If an LLP carries on business under a name that is not its registered 
name, it must comply with the provisions of the Business Names Act 1985.  Section 
4(1)(b) of the Business Names Act states that the corporate name of an LLP and 
the name of each member must be shown on all premises where the business is 
conducted under the business name so that clients, customers, and suppliers may 
have access to this information.  Business Names Act, 1985, c. 7, § 4(1)(b) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/7/contents.  This 
information must also be given in writing to any person who requests it.  Id. § 4(4).  
If the LLP fails to comply with these provisions of the Business Names Act, the 
members may be subject to criminal penalties and the LLP may be unable to 
enforce contracts made under the business name.  Id. §§ 5(1), 7(4)–(5). 
15
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on the records.58 
Once a name is cleared, the LLP may register with the 
Registrar of Companies.59  By this act of registration, the United 
Kingdom LLP becomes a separate legal entity from its members.60  
The Limited Liability Partnerships Act (“LLPA”) requires at least 
two members for incorporation, and the names of these members 
must be listed on the registration.61  For creation, the LLP must 
also disclose the intended place of the registered office of the 
LLP.62  The registered office states the country within Great Britain 
where the registered office is located, and the registered office 
must be situated within the country of registration.63  A member or 
agent/solicitor acting on the member’s behalf must sign the LLP’s 
incorporation document.64  If all requirements are met, the 
Registrar of Companies will issue a certificate of incorporation 
indicating the LLP’s date of incorporation, its registered number, 
and its legal existence as an LLP.65  The LLP may commence 
business upon its incorporation.66 
3. The Partnership AgreementTailoring the Investment 
As with general partnership law, an LLP is not required to 
adopt a written agreement regulating the internal relationship of 
its members.67  If the members do not submit their verbal 
 
 58. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 28(2) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents. 
 59. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 3(1) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents. 
 60. Id. § 1(2). 
 61. Id. § 2(1)(a).  The disclosure of the names of members also requires the 
indication of which members are designated members or non-designated 
members.  Id. § 2(2)(f).  In general, designated members are obligated to appoint 
an auditor, sign LLP documents, deliver accounts to the Registrar of Companies, 
send notices of amendments to the certificate of incorporation to the Registrar of 
Companies, prepare, sign, and file the LLP’s annual return, and to wind up and 
dissolve the LLP if such is required.  Id. §§ 8–9. 
 62. See id. § 2(2)(c). 
 63. See id.  Thus, an LLP registered in England or Wales may not have its 
registered office in Scotland and vice versa.  DOUGLAS ARMOUR, TOLLEY’S LIMITED 
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS: THE NEW LEGISLATION § 2.8, at 8 (2001). 
 64. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2(1)(b) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents; ARMOUR, 
supra note 63, § 2.5, at 5. 
 65. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 3 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents. 
 66. See id. § 3(4); ARMOUR, supra note 63, § 2.4., at 4–5. 
 67. ARMOUR, supra note 63, § 2.5, at 5. 
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understandings as to profits and losses as well as management in 
writing, the LLP Regulations of 2000 set out default rules that 
modify those of the Partnership Act of 1890.68  Thus, in the absence 
of a written agreement, the default LLP provisions provide that: 
(1) All members share equally in profits and losses; 
(2) The LLP must indemnify members for expenses incurred 
in relation to the LLP; 
(3) All members must participate in management; 
(4) Members are not entitled to remuneration for 
management duties carried out for the LLP; 
(5) All existing members agree to admit new members or to 
the assignment of an interest in the LLP by a member; 
(6) A member cannot be expelled without the express 
agreement of all members; 
(7) Business decisions will be made by majority unless the 
decision is concerning a change in the nature of the 
business, which requires consent of all members; 
(8) All members have access to books and records of the LLP; 
and 
(9) Members cannot compete against the LLP without 
consent of other members.69 
Neither the Scottish nor English Limited Liability Partnerships 
Acts statutorily permit the elimination of the fiduciary duties of 
care or loyalty by professionals.70  These Acts also do not contain 
any stated public policy of “freedom of contract.”71  In addition, the 
LLPA of 2000 adopted in England, Wales, and Scotland contains 
no provision authorizing the elimination of the common law 
fiduciary duties of care and non-competition owed by professionals 
or others to clients or by professionals to each other.72  It would 
appear, therefore, that the United Kingdom LLP is not as flexible 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  A “typical” United Kingdom LLP agreement will cover the following 
categories: nature of the LLP’s business; LLP’s name, property, and place of 
business; banking; members’ shares and contributions; profits and losses; draws; 
members’ duties; holiday entitlements; management; limits on members’ 
authority; admission of new members; indemnity; cars; insurance; retirement; 
expulsion; termination/winding up; covenants; notices; and arbitration.  Id. § 2.5, 
app. 1. 
 70. Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations, 2001, S.I. 2001/1090, § 7 
(U.K.), reprinted in ARMOUR, supra note 63, app. 2, at 123−24. 
 71. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents. 
 72. Id. 
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as the Delaware LLC on the issue of contractual modification or 
elimination of duties imposed by statute or common law among 
sophisticated parties in arm’s length transactions.  However, in 
practice in the United Kingdom, the “limitation” or “expansion” of 
fiduciary duties does not occur by statutory fiat.73  Rather, 
practitioners use the memorandum of association or articles of 
association and its detailed description of the entity’s purposes and 
objectives to “tailor” fiduciary duties.  Thus, by limiting a purpose 
or objectives clause to primary social purpose and reducing wealth 
maximization to a secondary objective, fiduciary duties are limited 
as well.  
In addition, the United Kingdom LLP apparently is broad 
enough to allow the creation of a for-profit, for-benefit entity.  In 
other words, a United Kingdom LLP may be incorporated for any 
“purpose” or “objective” that the members/investors desire.74  
Thereafter, the members, or the managing member, must 
implement the express purpose set out in the memorandum of 
association and articles of association for the benefit of the 
corporate entity.  The complexity of the management of this 
United Kingdom entity is its overlay of fiduciary duties commonly 
owed to equity holders operating in direct conflict with the express 
nonprofit, socially-driven, beneficial purposes of the LLP.  In short, 
in the absence of the contractual ability to modify, tailor, or 
eliminate conflicting profit-maximizing fiduciary duties, founders 
(visionaries) and investors (capital founders) in the United 
Kingdom LLP will always be at odds with each other at the outset.  
Capital investors and foundations generally seek some form of 
internal rate of return, whereas founding members may sacrifice 
profit in order to achieve the social goal (e.g., providing renewable 
energy sources to local neighborhoods).  The United Kingdom 
 
 73. See Judith Freedman, Limited Liability Partnerships in the United Kingdom—
Do They Have a Role for Small Firms?, 26 J. CORP. L. 897, 902 (2001) (explaining that 
the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations set out default provisions for the 
LLP but do not impose a duty of good faith and can be altered by the LLP 
agreement).  See generally Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents (containing 
no language concerning expanding or limiting fiduciary duties).   
 74. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2 (U.K), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents (explaining that any two 
or more persons associated for the carrying on of a lawful business with a view to 
profit may form an LLP if they subscribe their names to an incorporation 
document, which must be delivered to the registrar as statutorily specified).  The 
registrar will issue the certificate of incorporation if all is in order.  Id. § 3. 
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LLP attempts to address the socially-driven business equitably by 
allowing contractual tailoring in the purpose clause, but thereafter 
does not permit the contractual elimination or modification of the 
duties owed to the conflicting financial interests in the 
benefit/profit entity.  In this sense, the United Kingdom LLP of 
England, Scotland, and Wales goes far in inducing socially-driven 
businesses but does not go far enough in protecting outside 
investors.  
B. The United Kingdom “Private Company” 
1. General Introduction—The Memorandum of Association 
The United Kingdom Companies Act of 1985 provides in 
pertinent part that:  
(1) Any two or more persons associated for a lawful 
purpose may, by subscribing their names to a 
memorandum of association and otherwise complying 
with the requirements of this Act in respect of 
registration, form an incorporated company, with or 
without limited liability.   
(2) A company so formed may be either— 
(a) a company having the liability of its members 
limited by the memorandum to the amount, if any, 
unpaid on the shares respectively held by them (“a 
company limited by shares”);  
(b) a company having the liability of its members 
limited by the memorandum to such amount as the 
members may respectively thereby undertake to 
contribute to the assets of the company in the event 
of its being wound up (“a company limited by 
guarantee”); or 
(c) a company not having any limit on the liability of 
its members (“an unlimited company”).75 
 
 75. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 1, 2(a)–(c) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents.  Since July 15, 1993, 
pursuant to the European Community’s Twelfth Council Company Law Directive 
on single-member private limited liability companies, a private limited company 
may be formed with one person.  See Companies (Single Member Private Limited 
Companies) Regulations, 1992, S.I. 1992/1699, art. 2 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/1699/contents/made.  For more 
information about the European Community’s Law Directive see Council Directive 
89/667, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ 
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Under the Companies Act, the memorandum of association is 
often a lengthy public document setting forth in great detail its 
purposes, object, and authority, including whether it is limited or 
unlimited, or public or private.76  By striking contrast, the United 
States certificate of incorporation normally presents a paucity of 
information regarding the filing corporation.77  The United 
Kingdom memorandum of association may comprise as few as fifty 
or as many as a hundred pages or more of public documentation 
for the company’s formation.78  This memorandum of association is 
the company’s “constitution,” which records the purposes for 
which the entity is being incorporated and sets forth the 
distribution of power within the company and its internal 
procedural mechanisms.79 
Under the 1989 reform of the Companies Act, a United 
Kingdom company could not make the argument that a contract 
with a third party was ultra vires on the grounds that it was beyond 
the purposes or object stated in its memorandum of association.80  
 
/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0667:20070101:EN:PDF.   
 76. See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 1–3 (U.K), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents.  
 77. See, e.g., CORPORATE DOCUMENTS & PROCESS COMM. & CORPORATE LAW 
COMM., A.B.A., PUB. CO. ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS: MODEL FORMS AND 
COMMENTARY 57–74 (2009) (illustrating the scarcity of information required about 
a filing corporation in a certificate of incorporation by showing an example of a 
certificate of incorporation for Delaware). 
 78. See Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations, 1985, S.I. 2007/2826 (U.K.) 
(amended 2007), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2826 
/contents/made (outlining the requirements and form of memoranda of 
association under United Kingdom Companies Act).   
 79. In like manner, in Delaware it is widely understood that a certificate of 
incorporation is a “contract” between the corporation, state, and its stockholders, 
as well as between the corporation and its stockholders “inter sese.”  See Morris v. 
Am. Pub. Utils. Co., 122 A. 696, 700 (Del. Ch. 1923).  In addition, the Delaware 
Code provides:  
In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of 
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of 
incorporation may also contain any or all of the following matters: 
(1) Any provision for the management of the business and for the 
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, 
defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the 
directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, or 
the . . . members . . . of a nonstock corporation; if such provisions 
are not contrary to the laws of this State.  Any provision which is 
required or permitted by any section of this chapter to be stated in 
the bylaws may instead be stated in the certificate of incorporation. 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2010). 
 80. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 35 (U.K.), as superseded by Companies Act, 
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Thus, it is the duty of the directors of a United Kingdom company 
to know and act within the limitations of the memorandum of 
association.81 
In 2006, the Companies Act was modernized and the 
memorandum of association re-defined.82  Under section 8 of the 
Companies Act 2006, the memorandum of association is defined as: 
“a memorandum stating that the subscribers—(a) wish to form a 
company under this Act, and (b) agree to become members of the 
company and, in the case of a company that is to have a share 
capital, to take at least one share each.”83  The policy of the new 
definition is to shift the emphasis from the memorandum of 
association of a limited company being the document that details 
the purposes and objects of the company to the articles of 
association.84  In this manner, the formative document remains the 
combination of the memorandum of association and the articles of 
association, but only the articles of association become the 
“constitution” of the company under the reformed Act. 
2. The Articles of Association—Tailoring the Investment 
Whereas the memorandum of association before set forth a 
company’s purposes, objects, authority, internal structure, and 
nature, the articles of association provided for the internal 
management of the company, including any limitations on the 
 
1989, c. 40, § 108(1) (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga 
/1985/6/contents (“The validity of an act done by a company shall not be called 
into question on the ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the 
company’s memorandum.”). 
 81. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108(3) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents (“It remains the duty of 
the directors to observe any limitations on their powers flowing from the 
company’s memorandum; and action by the directors which but for subsection (1) 
would be beyond the company’s capacity may only be ratified by the company by 
special resolution.  A resolution ratifying such action shall not affect any liability 
incurred by the directors or any other person; relief from any such liability must 
be agreed to separately by special resolution.”). 
 82. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, Introduction (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents (“An Act to reform 
company law and restate the greater part of the enactments relating to companies 
. . . .”). 
 83. Id. § 8. 
 84. See id. § 8, nn. 32–34 (noting that, in the future, “key information 
regarding the internal allocation of powers between the directors and members of 
a company will be set out in one place: the articles of association”). 
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powers of directors as agents for the company.85  A company could 
register its articles of association at Companies House.86  If a 
company was limited by shares, it could choose to not register its 
articles of association, in which case “Table A” of the Companies 
Act applied to the company to the extent provisions in the table 
were not excluded by the company.87 
With the 2006 reforms, the articles of association now must be 
filed with the memorandum of association.88  The articles must set 
forth the internal regulation of the company.89  The articles may 
also set out “provisions for entrenchment” that require 
modification or amendment procedures or conditions that are 
more restrictive than those necessary for a special resolution.  The 
articles may not, however, limit or eliminate managerial liability for 
negligence or breach of duty since such provisions would be 
deemed void under section 232 of the Companies Act 2006.90 
Under the prior law, the legal effect of the memorandum and 
the articles of association, when registered, was that the company 
and its members were bound “to the same extent as if they 
respectively had been signed and sealed by each member.”91  The 
memorandum and articles, like the United States certificate of 
incorporation, constituted a contract between the members and 
the company and between the members inter se.92  Under this 
 
 85. See id. § 2. 
 86. See id. § 7.  See generally GBF1 Company Formation, COS. HOUSE, (Nov. 2007), 
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/pdf/ca_gbf1.pdf (summarizing the 
procedural requirements for forming a company under the Companies Act 2006). 
 87. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 8(2), Table A (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents. 
 88. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 8 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation 
.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents; id. § 9 (stating that when registering, the 
application must be delivered to the registrar together with a memorandum of 
association and, among other things, a copy of any proposed articles of 
association); id. § 18.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. § 232.  
 91. Companies Act, 1985, chapter 6, section 14(1) (U.K.) provides:  
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, when 
registered, bind the company and its members to the same extent as if 
they respectively had been signed and sealed by each member, and 
contained covenants on the part of each member to observe all the 
provisions of the memorandum and of the articles. 
 92. See Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders Ass’n, [1915] 1 Ch. 
881, [903] (Eng.) (stating that general articles dealing with the rights of members 
should be “treated as a statutory agreement between them and the company as 
well as between themselves inter se”); supra note 79 and accompanying text 
(discussing a certificate of incorporation acting as a contract). 
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contractual theory, a member could enforce a “personal” right 
such as a right to a dividend or a voting right.  An “outside” right—
such as the right of a member to be a director or a solicitor for the 
company—was only enforceable by the company and not by the 
member personally.93  In sum, the contractual rights of members 
provided by the memorandum or articles were enforceable by 
members personally only if those claims involve rights or 
obligations of members qua members.  The articles could be 
modified or amended by the members “bona fide” if it was in the 
interest of the company.  Both amendment and modification 
required a majority vote or unanimous consent.94  Because the 
articles constitute a contractual right, the members could vote in 
their self-interest in determining the company’s “best interest.”  
The contractual effect of section 14 of the Companies Act and 
its ensuing case law has been the target of great academic debate in 
the United Kingdom.95  Despite great consideration for reform by 
the United Kingdom Law Commission to move section 20 from a 
contractual basis to a statutory one, the Law Commission instead 
suggested a careful definition of “personal” rights under a 
memorandum and articles.96  
Under the reform of 2006, the articles of association and any 
resolutions or agreements create the constitution of the company.97  
New companies formed in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and 
Scotland are subject to the reform version of the Companies Act 
 
 93. See Hickman, 1 Ch. at 896–97. 
 94. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 9 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents; see also Allen v. Gold 
Reefs of W. Afr. Ltd., [1900] 1 A.C. 656, [671] (Eng.) (stating that articles can be 
altered and will be binding if they are “bona fide for the benefit of the company”). 
 95. For an overview of the debate, see K.W. Wedderburn, Shareholders’ Rights 
and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 15 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194 (1957) (advocating 
personal contractual rights for everything except provisions identified as 
procedural only).  See also G.D. Goldberg, The Enforcement of Outsider Rights under 
Section 20 (1) of the Companies Act of 1948, 35 MOD. L. REV. 362 (1972) (advocating 
that a member has the contractual right to have any of the affairs of the company 
conducted as set forth in the memorandum and articles); Graham. N. Prentice, 
The Enforcement of Outsider Rights, 1 CO. LAWYER 179, 184 (1980) (stating that 
personal rights should only have contractual power if the provision is “definitive” 
to the power of the company).  
 96. ANNOTATED COMPANIES LEGISLATION 314 (John Birds et al. eds., 2010) 
(defining personal rights as “rights which are enforceable under the statutory 
contract”). 
 97. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 17 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents. 
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3. The Limited Company—Reflections for Social Responsibility 
 The United Kingdom limited company clearly has the 
contractual flexibility in its memorandum of association and 
articles of association to adopt a for-benefit, for-profit purpose for 
an existing or new socially-driven business.  It is apparent, though, 
that the limited company suffers the “transparency” burden of over-
disclosure.  Under the United Kingdom disclosure guidelines, not 
only will unnecessary information be disclosed in the 
memorandum of association, but the company will also be taxed 
with mandatory fiduciary duties, auditor controls, and adherence 
to insolvency and director disqualification statutes.99 
As for fiduciary duties, the United Kingdom limited company 
differs from the traditional United States corporation.  In the 
United States, directors are statutory managers of the corporation 
and owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders and the 
corporate enterprise.100  In the United Kingdom, directors act as 
agents of the corporation and their duties of care and loyalty run to 
the company rather than to the company’s members.101  In this 
manner, a United Kingdom limited company has more flexibility to 
create a “hybrid” nature with directors’ duties following the 
purpose and objective of the company.  Yet, the oddity of U.K. law 
is that this paradigm necessarily sets constituencies with adverse 
financial interests at odds with each other.  Directors of socially 
responsible, for-profit United Kingdom limited companies are 
 
 98. Id. §§ 1–6. 
 99. Id. §§ 82–85. 
 100. The board of directors in a U.S. corporation is vested with original 
statutory authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.  See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010).  In a jurisdiction such as Delaware, the 
directors must manage the corporation in accordance with the common law 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  Stone ex rel. Am. S. Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (holding that the obligation to act in “good faith” is 
not an independent fiduciary duty but is a “subsidiary element” of the duty of 
loyalty).  Therefore, a contractual modification of a certificate of incorporation to 
add “stakeholders” beyond shareholders would reasonably create contractual 
(potentially third-party beneficiary) rights but would not necessarily create 
fiduciary duties or standing to the specified stakeholders, including members of 
the community or the environment at large.  An independent statute would 
require this type of judicial recognition but, even then, such an act would not strip 
the judiciary of their “equitable” powers to “do justice.” 
 101. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 171–177 (U.K.), available at http://www 
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents. 
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tasked with sorting and implementing the purposes, however 
mismatched financially, set forth in the company’s memorandum 
of association or articles of association.102  
C.   The B or Beneficial Corporation 
1. General Introduction 
The B, or Beneficial, Corporation103 is the brainchild of B Lab, 
a nonprofit corporation established in 2006 and based in Berwyn, 
Pennsylvania.104  In a nutshell, the concept of B Lab is that a 
company should be able to “do good” and “give back” to the 
community, customers, suppliers, and the environment without 
concern about shareholder suits for failure to maximize 
shareholder value at all costs.105  Although B Lab is itself organized 
as a nonprofit corporation, the concept B Lab espouses is a new 
type of corporation that would require: (1) an amendment to a 
company’s articles of incorporation stating that it is a beneficial 
corporation whose purpose is to maximize the interests of the 
company’s “stakeholders,”106 including its employees, customers, 
 
 102. Id. § 171(a). 
 103. Currently there are 454 B Corporations in fifty-four different industries, 
with $2.18 billion in revenue and $1 million in annual savings.  About Certified B 
Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).   
 104. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 793 n.12.  
 105. A business’s focus on all constituencies of a company as well as on 
accomplishing a socially responsible purpose is often referred to as the “triple 
bottom line.”  See Carolina Miranda, Human Capital: The “People” Part of the Triple 
Bottom Line, CULTIVATING CAPITAL (July 8, 2011), http://www.cultivatingcapital 
.com/category/triple-bottom-line.  
 106. The theory of “stakeholder” interests in a corporation is not new to 
corporate law.  For example, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the Delaware Supreme Court noted that, in the context 
of a hostile tender offer, a board of directors might be warranted in considering 
the interests of note holders in addition to those of stockholders.  Id. at 182 (citing 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).  Although 
this language in Revlon was dicta by the court and was never repeated in another 
Delaware Supreme Court case, an investor could file a certificate of incorporation 
today in Delaware that adopted a “beneficial” purpose and the Secretary of State’s 
Office would accept that filing.  However, because Delaware never adopted a 
“constituency” statute, the legal question presented by such a filing is: What duties 
would Delaware directors owe to the employees, creditors, community, and 
environment?  Under Delaware’s common law, it would seem that the certificate 
could not create fiduciary duties to anyone but shareholders.  The open question 
is whether the purpose clause is broad enough to create third-party beneficiary 
rights in the “constituencies” thus named.  Another issue is the application of the 
business judgment rule to the decisions by Delaware directors where the certificate 
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suppliers, the community in which it operates, and the 
environment;107 and (2) a certification by B Lab that the company 
is a B Corporation.108 
2. Formation and Management 
The B Corporation, as a new type of entity, requires a separate 
corporate statute for its formation.109  One recently enacted statute 
is that found in Vermont.110  Under the Vermont Benefit 
Corporation Act, a benefit corporation is formed when its articles 
of incorporation are either filed or amended to include the 
statement: “This corporation is a benefit corporation.”111  In 
addition, a benefit corporation must exist for a “general public 
benefit” as defined by having “a material positive impact on society 
and the environment, as measured by a third-party standard, 
through activities that promote some combination of specific 
public benefits.”112  A specific public benefit is defined under the 
Vermont Benefit Corporation Act.113  Any amendment of the 
 
has broadened the scope of “stakeholders.”  See Lessons to Be Learned, supra note 21, 
at 794–95 & nn.16–17. 
 107. See Understand Legal, B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net 
/become/legal (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).   
 108. Only B Lab can “certify” that a company is a legitimate B Corporation, 
providing quite a boon for B Lab.  Become a B Corporation, B CORPORATION, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  For this service 
B Lab receives one-tenth of one percent of the corporation’s annual revenue.  See 
Hannah Clark Steiman, A New Kind of Company: A “B” Corporation, INC.COM (July 1, 
2007),  http://www.inc.com/magazine/20070701/priority-a-new-kind-of-company 
.html.  If a company is not seeking certification, access to the metrics of 
compliance is free.  The B Impact Rating System, B CORPORATION, http://www. 
bcorporation.net/become/BRS (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  B Lab generally rates a 
new company on five factors—community, consumers, employees, environment, 
and leadership.  See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 793 n.12. 
 109. Four states presently have B Corporation statutes: Maryland, New Jersey, 
Vermont, and Virginia.  See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to -08 
(West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 to -11 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, 
§§ 21.01 to .14 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2011).  Other states 
have introduced legislation regarding B Corporations.  See, e.g., S.B. 1462, 26th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011). 
 110. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.01 to .14 (2011). 
 111. Id. § 21.03(a)(1) (defining a benefit corporation). 
 112. Id. § 21.03(a)(4). 
 113. See id. § 21.03(a)(6)(A)–(G) (“[A specific public benefit includes:] (A) 
providing low income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial 
products or services; (B) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or 
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business; (C) 
preserving or improving the environment; (D) improving human health; (E) 
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articles of incorporation to add, amend, or delete a specific public 
benefit requires a two-thirds vote of the outstanding shares of the 
benefit corporation.114 
Once the benefit corporation is formed, its management is 
similar to that of the traditional board of directors, with one 
exception: the addition of a “benefit director.”115  The primary 
purpose of the benefit director is to file the annual “benefit report” 
that states whether or not the directors of the benefit corporation 
have complied with their general and specific public benefit 
purposes.116   
Non-benefit directors must act in the best interests of the 
benefit corporation, including:  
(A) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (B) the 
employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and 
its subsidiaries and suppliers; (C) the interests of 
customers to the extent they are beneficiaries of the 
general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit 
corporation; (D) community and societal considerations, 
including those of any community in which offices or 
facilities of the benefit corporation or its subsidiaries or 
suppliers are located; (E) the local and global 
environment; and (F) the long-term and short-term 
interests of the benefit corporation, including the 
possibility that those interests may be best served by the 
continued independence of the benefit corporation.117 
The board of directors of the benefit corporation is not 
required to give priority to any specific constituency of the 
corporation.118  The directors of a benefit corporation are not held 
to a “different or higher standard of care when an action or 
inaction might affect control of the benefit corporation.”119  
Directors do not owe fiduciary duties to all designated beneficiaries 
 
promoting the arts or sciences or the advancement of knowledge; (F) increasing 
the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; and (G) the 
accomplishment of any other identifiable benefit for society or the 
environment.”).   
 114. Id. § 21.08(e). 
 115. Id. § 21.10. 
 116. Id. § 21.10(c)(3)(A). 
 117. Id. § 21.09(a)(1)(A)–(F). 
 118. Id. § 21.09(a)(3) (providing that the board of directors is not required to 
give preference to any particular person or group unless the articles of 
incorporation have designated a priority among the stakeholders). 
 119. Id. § 21.09(a)(4). 
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under the corporation’s articles of incorporation merely because 
the person is a beneficiary of a general or specific beneficial 
purpose.120  Instead, directors only owe fiduciary duties to those 
who may bring a benefit enforcement proceeding against the 
benefit corporation.121  An enforcement proceeding may be 
brought by: (1) a shareholder who otherwise had that right; (2) a 
director; (3) a person or group of persons owning ten percent or 
more in an entity of which the beneficial corporation is a 
subsidiary; or (4) those persons named in the articles of 
incorporation.122 
3. Certification 
The Vermont Act, unlike the B Lab paradigm, does not 
require a “certification” for the formation of a benefit 
corporation.123  Rather, in assessing the compliance of the 
corporation with its beneficial purposes, the benefit director, in the 
annual benefit report, must apply a “third-party standard” of 
performance.124  The “third-party standard” is defined in the 
Vermont Act as: “[A] recognized standard for defining, reporting, 
and assessing corporate social and environmental performance 
that . . . (A) is developed by a person that is independent of the 
benefit corporation; and (B) is transparent because the  . . . 
information about the standard is publicly available.”125 
The B Lab system requires a corporation to score “40 out of 
100 on a survey B Lab developed after consulting with more than 
150 entrepreneurs, investors, and academics.”126  Some of the 
criteria that gain points for potential B Corporation candidates 
include “democratic decision making, having good benefits, 
donating profits to charity, and being energy efficient.”127  
However, the B Lab certification monopoly has not gained uniform 
acceptance among founders of socially-driven businesses.128 
For example, in the organic farming industry, some have 
 
 120. Id. § 21.09(e). 
 121. Id.; see also id. § 21.13(a). 
 122. Id. § 21.13(b)(1)–(4). 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 111–14; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, 
§ 21.05. 
 124. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(d)(2). 
 125. Id. § 21.03(a)(8). 
 126. See Steiman, supra note 108. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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alleged that the “organic certification system” is “somewhat 
suspect” and “has actually weakened their movement by enabling 
the creation of organic factory farms.”129  Some of the questions on 
B Lab’s survey have dubious relevance or social value.130  All socially-
driven businesses are not created equally, nor are their purposes 
equally “certifiable.”  As in the Vermont Act, a third-party annual 
review of compliance with “benefit” objectives is a logically better 
indicia of how well a socially responsible business is performing on 
an annual basis than a single source “certification” made in a “one-
size-fits-all” package. 
4. The Truth About Benefit Corporations 
Just as the “agile virtual corporation” set “best practices” 
standards fifteen years ago,131 the benefit corporation may well be 
in search of standards today.  Yet, it is nonsensical to assume that 
only B Lab can provide “certification” for all beneficial, socially 
responsible businesses.132  First, B Lab assumes that the corporate 
form is the subliminal choice of entity for socially-driven 
organizations.133  Yet, with the corporate form comes a statutory 
board of directors, officers, other mandatory compliance 
requirements, and over one hundred years of ingrained common 
law application of traditional fiduciary concepts, including the 
bedrock governance principle that directors must maximize 
shareholder wealth in the best interest of the corporate enterprise.  
With such a well-established, traditionally-based statutory 
infrastructure, one must immediately wonder why B Lab chose this 
bastion of corporateness as its target for implementing 
“stakeholder” interests.  In Delaware alone, B Lab need only have 
looked to the most popular Delaware entity being formed today—
that of the limited liability company (LLC)—and virtually all of its 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  One example of such a question: “Are corporate events or team-
building exercises held at least twice annually?”  Id. 
 131. Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
497, 499 n.11 (1997) (describing the purpose and scope of re-engineering 
businesses in an evolving global economy). 
 132. Another nonprofit organization, the Natural Capital Institute, is 
developing a standard for “responsible business” that will be launched soon.  
Steiman, supra note 108.   
 133. B Corporation Declaration of Interdependence, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION 
(2008), http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Bcorp_SM 
_Declaration.pdf. 
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impediments would disappear.  So why a B Corporation? 
First, B Lab itself is organized as a nonprofit corporation in 
Pennsylvania.134  However, in order to “sell” “doing good” and 
“giving back” to private investors in a down economy, B Lab needs 
a vehicle that can blend nonprofit and profit characteristics.  The 
form in which B Lab is organized cannot work because as a 
nonprofit all monies are distributed to the company and not its 
members.135  Pennsylvania does not presently have a benefit 
corporation statute so a “new” form of entity would have to be 
created if the corporate form were to be retained.136  In this story, it 
appears that the marketing of a B Corporation got ahead of the 
legal practicalities (or more logically stated, the legal morass of the 
B Corporation).  In hindsight, the founders of B Lab would have 
been well-advised to abandon the B Corporation moniker and 
instead seek out the best choice of entity for their platform.  
In short, the B Corporation of B Lab origination is overly 
paternalistic as well as structurally unsound.  The entity envisioned 
by B Lab is inflexible with its corporate infrastructure, overly broad 
with its “constituency” purpose clause, and legally uncertain with its 
attempt by contract law to usurp over one hundred years of 
corporate fiduciary duty law.  Certainly, the social and 
environmental development sought by B Lab is laudable.  However, 
the same result is more readily attained and legally defensible by 
the contractually created LLC.  By trying to fit “benefit” into more 
than one hundred years of corporate common law, B Lab is 
hammering the proverbial square peg into a round hole—an 
endeavor that causes much frenzy, but guarantees no return on the 
investment.  
As for statutory attempts such as that in Vermont, the “benefit” 
entity remains inflexible with its corporate structure and its added 
feature of a “benefit” director.137  Notwithstanding the Vermont 
Act’s attempt to define the benefit corporation directors’ duties 
 
 134. Jay Coen Gilbert, Remarks on White/Leach Benefit Corporation Bill Upon 
Introduction to the Pennsylvania State Senate (Feb. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/B%20Lab%20remar
ks_PA_020711.pdf.  
 135. Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Distribution of Funds by Nonprofit 
Corporation Absent Dissolution, 51 A.L.R.3d 1318 (1973). 
 136. The Pennsylvania Legislature is currently contemplating legislation to 
recognize B Corporations as a legal entity.  S.B. 433, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Pa. 2011). 
 137. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 21.12 (2011). 
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with respect to whom may bring a claim, it seems inequitable that 
corporate law would create a “stakeholder” entity that permits no 
protection for those very “stakeholders.”138  In addition, if a benefit 
corporation is statutorily established for a primarily social purpose, 
then in “equity” or “fairness” it seems that a court would hold 
directors liable for failure to exercise care and loyalty in seeking to 
achieve that primary goal rather than shareholder wealth 
maximization.  If the goal is to relieve directors of liability in 
benefit corporations, then states adopting benefit legislation must 
be willing to provide for statutory elimination of directorial duties 
to non-traditional “stakeholder” interests.  Due to the paucity of 
statutory authority to eliminate fiduciary duties, courts will certainly 
rely upon their equitable powers to “do equity” and “impose 
fairness” in appropriate cases.  For these reasons alone, the B 
Corporation is a legal nightmare. 
D. The “L3C” or Low-Profit Limited Liability Company 
1. General Background 
The “L3C,” or “low-profit limited liability company,” came 
onto the new entity scene in 2008.139  The L3C is another hybrid 
social entrepreneur organization that attempts to blend “program 
related investments,” or PRIs, with some small degree of income 
production for private foundations.140  In the field of renewable 
energy technologies, startup companies need significant funding 
sources.  One obvious beginning path is founder capital.  Once this 
base is tapped, venture capital or foundations become important 
 
 138. The constituency acts were not enacted with benefit corporations in 
mind, but rather to fend off hostile takeovers—a distinctly different concern than 
that being pursued by B Lab.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202(A) (2010); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-
221 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-602 (2010); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 
(2010); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2010); IOWA CODE § 490.1108A (2010); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.92(G) (1994); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 831 (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (2010); 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2010); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 351.347 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2045(1) (2010); N.J. REV. STAT. §14A:6-
1 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) 
(Consol. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 
60.357(5) (2010); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715-16 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) 
(2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2010); 
WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (2010). 
 139. Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 273. 
 140. Id. at 282–83. 
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resources.  Foundations often have excess funds that will be subject 
to an excise tax if not invested.141  These funds may be invested and 
receive beneficial tax treatment if they qualify as a PRI.142  A PRI 
must meet three requirements under the Internal Revenue Code: 
(1) “The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one 
or more of” the specified requirements (religious, scientific, 
educational, literary, or charitable); (2) “No significant purpose of 
the investment is the production of income or the appreciation of 
property”; and (3) “No purpose of the investment” is to influence 
legislation or to participate in political campaigns.143  
In the renewable energy sector, a foundation could qualify for 
a PRI under the Treasury definition so long as the primary purpose 
of the investment was to further the scientific objective of 
advancing research, development, and implementation of solar 
and wind energy in a particular sector, and this was a primary goal 
of the foundation’s investment objective.144  If the company also 
had private investors with the objective of receiving a return on 
their investment, the motive of the private investors should not 
affect the PRI so long as the PRI was below-market.145 
2. The Vermont Act 
Vermont was the first jurisdiction to adopt an L3C statute.146  
According to the Vermont Act, an L3C is described to mirror the 
federal definition of a program-related investment.147  Therefore, a 
Vermont L3C must: (1) significantly further the accomplishment of 
a charitable or educational purpose within the meaning of the 
Internal Revenue Code and would not be formed but for the 
objective of accomplishing such purpose; (2) no significant 
purpose of the L3C is the production of income or the 
 
 141. Id. at 276–79 (setting forth the various excise taxes on foundations 
regarding charitable gifts). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(2011). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 5. 
 146. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2010).  Other jurisdictions with L3C 
legislation include: Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Utah, 
and Wyoming.  See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1302(C) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31 § 1611 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
450.4102(m) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01(d) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-
2c-412 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix)(2010). 
 147. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A), with Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-
3(2)(i).  
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appreciation of property; and (3) no purpose of the company is to 
accomplish a political or legislative purpose or goal as defined in 
the Internal Revenue Code.148  Next, the certificate of formation 
must indicate that the company is an L3C and the name must bear 
the designation, “L3C.”149  Finally, if the L3C ceases to satisfy the 
requirements for an L3C, the company defaults to an LLC and 
must amend its certificate to indicate this change in status.150   
3. The Truth About L3C Legislation 
The obvious difficulty with the Vermont Act is that it does not 
even require a “purposes” clause in the articles of organization.151  
Thus, unlike the B Corporation, there is no clear mechanism in the 
statute whereby investors or outsiders can gauge whether the L3C is 
in compliance with its stated literary, educational, scientific, 
charitable, or religious objectives.152  Also, the Vermont Act places 
no mandate on the members of the L3C to file a “compliance with 
benefits objectives” through a third-party annual review.153  The 
Vermont L3C simply comes into existence by stating that it is such 
in the articles of organization and thereafter utilizes the required 
L3C designation.154  For private investors, the L3C appellation is no 
guarantee that the LLC will operate any differently than a standard 
limited liability company.155  For foundations seeking PRIs, federal 
law mandates supervision of and compliance with investment 
standards.156  State acts such as that in Vermont do not further the 
cause for private foundation funding.157   
The L3C proponents have been successful in lobbying for 
legislation without fully balancing all options available for private 
foundation funding or the confusion, ambiguity, and possible 
misrepresentation caused by state legislation in this area without 
parallel federal tax legislation.  Certainly, private letter rulings 
 
 148. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)–(C). 
 149. Id. §§ 3026(a)(6), 3005(a)(2). 
 150. Id. § 2001(27)(D).   
 151. See supra Part III.B.1.   
 152. See supra Part III.C.2.   
 153. See supra Part III.C.3.   
 154. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)-(D).   
 155. See supra Part III.B.1.   
 156. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (2011).   
 157. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 282–86 (“[B]y focusing on the 
LLC’s profit motivation, the Vermont statute arguably eviscerates L3Cs as a 
method for attracting capital and encouraging beneficial economic growth.”).   
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make clear that these L3C acts are unnecessary.158  In a 2006 private 
letter ruling involving an LLC, where a foundation made an 
investment in businesses in low-income communities owned or 
controlled by members of minority or other disadvantaged groups 
who were unable to secure reasonable traditional financing for the 
purpose of community benefits, the question was raised whether 
the foundation investment constituted a PRI.159  In a favorable 
ruling, the Internal Revenue Service examined the foundation’s 
mission, objectives, and goals, which included aiding groups to 
achieve economic and educational independence and giving back 
to low-income communities, and concluded that the investment 
mirrored the foundation’s charitable and educational purposes.160  
In this case, the fund would only invest if the business had been 
denied traditional financing and sixty-seven percent of the owners 
or controllers of the business were in fact members of 
disadvantaged groups.161  Thus, an L3C was not necessary to the 
success of using an LLC for PRI investments.162  What is necessary is 
that the investment matches the mission and objectives of the 
foundation and the operating agreement reflects that mission. 
4. The Problem with Statutory Fiduciary Duties 
The Vermont Act tracks many of the uniform unincorporated 
acts by setting forth mandatory fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty.163  The duty of care, which is not actually a “fiduciary duty,” 
requires that a member or manager not act in a grossly negligent 
or reckless manner or with intent to do harm or commit fraud.164  
This so-called fiduciary duty of care is actually a mere standard of 
accountability and has now been labeled as such by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its newly-
revised Harmonized Uniform Business Organization Code.165  The 
 
 158. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.   
 159. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020, at 1–3, 18 (Mar. 10, 2006).   
 160. Id. at 3, 24–35.   
 161. Id. at 8.   
 162. Id. at 4, 35 (concluding that the foundation’s contributions to a fund 
organized as an LLC “qualify as a program-related investment”).   
 163. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3059(a)–(c) (2011). 
 164. See HARMONIZED UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 409(c) (2011) (“The duty of care 
of a member of a member-managed limited liability company in the conduct or 
winding up of the company’s activities and affairs is to refrain from engaging in 
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing 
violation of law.”).   
 165. See id. 
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duty of loyalty, on the other hand, requires that members or 
managers not take LLC property without the consent of other 
members, not act in a manner adverse to the LLC, and not take an 
opportunity or compete with the LLC in certain circumstances.166 
As with the B Corporation, these traditional fiduciary duties 
“work” where the only “stakeholders” are members, managers, or 
others set out in the LLC operating agreement.167  On the other 
hand, the fiduciary duties of “care and loyalty” were inserted into 
the LLC acts based upon a presumption that the common law of 
partnerships and limited partnerships was somehow applicable to 
the new, hybrid LLC.  That presumption fails if the purpose of an 
L3C is to expand the “stakeholders” of the business beyond that 
intended by the original LLC acts.  Arguably, the better approach is 
that in Delaware and jurisdictions that follow a statutory policy of 
“freedom of contract,” rather than implication of fiduciary duties, 
since under the Delaware approach, parties are free to draft any 
duties desired in order to tailor them to the nature of the 
enterprise as well as the investors and the investments.  At present, 
the Vermont Act serves only to set non-traditional “stakeholders” 
with opposite financial interests at odds with one another.  The Act 
grants no flexibility for sophisticated investors to remove counter-
productive duties where necessary. 
E. The Delaware Limited Liability Company (LLC) 
1. General Background and History 
Delaware adopted the Delaware Limited Liability Company 
Act (“DLLCA”) in 1992168 as the last of its unincorporated entity 
statutes.169  When the DLLCA was enacted, the statute contained 
the language that permitted each Delaware unincorporated entity 
to: 
(1) expand or restrict duties (including fiduciary duties) 
owed by a person or partner to each other or to the entity, 
 
 166. See VT. STAT. tit. 11, § 3059(b)(1)–(3).  
 167. See, e.g., id. § 3060 (noting permitted actions by “members”).  
 168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (2010) (Delaware Limited 
Liability Company Act). 
 169. See, for example, Delaware’s other unincorporated acts, id. §§ 15-101 to -
1210 (2010) (Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act enacted in 1999); id. §§ 
17-101 to -1111 (2010) (Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
enacted in 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801–3826 (2010) (Delaware Statutory 
Trust Act enacted in 1988). 
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provided that the private organic agreement did not 
“eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing”170; 
(2) limit or eliminate the liability of a partner or other person 
to each other or to the entity for breach of contract or 
breach of fiduciary duty, provided that no exculpation 
could be granted in a private organic document for any 
act or omission that constituted “a bad faith violation of 
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing”171; and 
(3) exculpate a partner or other person that is a party to the 
entity’s private organic document or is otherwise bound 
by that agreement for breach of fiduciary duty, where 
such person relies in good faith upon the terms of the 
private organic document.172 
In 2004, the Delaware General Assembly amended the 
language “expand or restrict” when used to delineate the 
contractual parameter of “duties,” to clearly include the term 
“eliminate.”173  Although some found the 2004 amendments 
surprising, in retrospect the amendments simply mirrored 
Delaware’s stated public policy in its unincorporated entity law that 
“[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
limited liability company agreements.”174 
The obvious benefit of the Delaware LLC is that the entity 
 
 170. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c); see also id. § 15-103(f) (2010) 
(permitting a partnership agreement to limit or eliminate “any and all liabilities 
for breach of contract and breach of duties”); id. § 17-1101(d) (permitting a 
partner’s duties to be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by a limited partnership 
agreement); DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 12, § 3806(c) (permitting a trustee’s duties to be 
expanded, restricted, or eliminated by the governing instrument).  
 171. DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 6, § 18-1101(e); see also id. § 15-103(f) (providing that 
a partnership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for a bad faith act or 
omission); id. § 17-1101(f) (providing that a limited partnership agreement may 
not limit or eliminate liability for a bad faith act or omission); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
12, § 3806(e) (providing that a governing instrument may not limit or eliminate 
liability for a bad faith act or omission).  
 172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (permitting the elimination of fiduciary 
duties in general partnerships); id. § 17-1101(d) (permitting the elimination of 
fiduciary duties in limited partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (permitting the 
elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(c) 
(permitting the elimination of fiduciary duties in statutory trusts). 
 173. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(c), 17-1101(d), 15-103(f); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(c).  
 174. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b). 
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generally avoids entity level taxation.175  Next, Delaware LLCs enjoy 
significant contractual flexibility that permits sponsors to create a 
private or public entity and to install any managerial infrastructure 
that reflects the dynamics of the nature and purposes of the LLC.176  
This internal malleability also extends to founders and investors to 
craft noneconomic equity interests177 or to eliminate voting rights 
of some members if desired.178  In addition, a public LLC is subject 
to different rules and regulations than corporations under the 
stock exchanges as well as the federal securities laws—rules that 
significantly affect the internal governance of the entity and the 
rights of owners/investors.179  The 2004 amendments to Delaware’s 
unincorporated entity acts authorized sponsors and investors to 
contractually limit or eliminate duties and liabilities of owners or 
managers to each other, the entity, or another person that is a 
party to the entity’s private agreement.  Additionally, Delaware’s 
 
 175. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 790.  Unincorporated entities are 
today classified for tax purposes under the “check-the-box” tax regulations.  Treas. 
Reg. § 301.7701-2 to -3 (2010).  Under the “check-the-box” regulations an “eligible 
entity” is a business organization for federal tax purposes that is not treated as a 
trust and is not mandated to be treated as a corporation for taxation treatment.  
Id. § 301.7701-2.  If the organization has a sole owner, it may be classified as a 
disregarded entity; if it has two or more owners, it may elect partnership tax 
treatment; or, as a corporation regardless of the number of owners.  Id. § 
301.7701-2 to -3.  The “check-the-box” “election” is made by the taxpayer on Form 
8832.  Id. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i). 
 176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (“[The] policy of this chapter is to 
give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract.”). 
 177. Id. § 18-301(d) (describing the requirements for admission of members in 
a Delaware LLC). 
 178. Id. § 18-302(a) (describing classes and voting rights in a Delaware LLC). 
 179. In 2007, The Blackstone Group, L.P. went public as a Delaware limited 
partnership.  In a statement equally applicable to public LLCs, The Blackstone 
Group, L.P. noted: 
We are a limited partnership and will qualify for exceptions from certain 
corporate governance and other requirements of the rules of the New 
York Stock Exchange.  Pursuant to these exceptions, limited partnerships 
may elect not to comply with certain corporate governance requirements 
of the New York Stock Exchange, including the requirements (1) that a 
majority of the board of directors of our general partner consist of 
independent directors, [and] (2) that we have a nominating/corporate 
governance committee that is composed entirely of independent 
directors . . . . In addition, we will not be required to hold annual 
meetings of our common unitholders.  Following this offering, we intend 
to avail ourselves of these exceptions.  Accordingly, you will not have the 
same protections afforded to equityholders of entities that are subject to 
all of the corporate governance requirements of the New York Stock 
Exchange.   
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP, L.P, PROSPECTUS (FORM 424(B)(4)) 55 (2007).   
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Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court now have more 
combined case law experience in matters of LLC contract 
interpretation than any other jurisdiction.180 
2. Forming and Tailoring the Business 
In order to form a Delaware LLC, one or more authorized 
persons must execute a certificate of formation.181  The certificate 
of formation must be filed with the Secretary of State and must 
contain the name of the limited liability company, including the 
designation LLC or L.L.C., the address of the registered office, and 
the name and address of the registered agent for service of 
process.182  The certificate of formation may also contain any other 
information the parties desire.183  The actual formation of a 
Delaware LLC is somewhat confusing.  Section 18-201(b) provides:  
A limited liability company is formed at the time of the 
filing of the initial certificate of formation in the office of 
the Secretary of State or at any later date or time specified 
in the certificate of formation if, in either case, there has 
been substantial compliance with the requirements of this 
section.  A limited liability company formed under this 
chapter shall be a separate legal entity, the existence of 
which as a separate legal entity shall continue until 
cancellation of the limited liability company’s certificate 
of formation.184 
However, Delaware requires the existence of an LLC operating 
agreement to form a Delaware LLC.185  Pursuant to section 18-
201(d), an LLC agreement “shall be entered into or otherwise 
existing either before, after or at the time of the filing of a 
certificate of formation.”186  The LLC agreement may be oral, 
implied, or written,187 but is not subject to the statute of frauds.188  
 
 180. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (permitting the 
elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs); Delaware LLC Operating Agreement, 
MYLLCAGREEMENT.COM,  http://www.myllcagreement.com/state-llc-agreement 
/delaware-llc-operating-agreement.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (stating that 
one of the many reasons Delaware is often the choice state to form an LLC is 
Delaware has a considerable amount of LLC case law). 
 181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(a). 
 182. Id. § 18-201(a)(1)–(2). 
 183. Id. § 18-201(3). 
 184. Id. § 18-201(b). 
 185. Id. § 18-201(d). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. § 18-101(7) (“‘[L]imited liability company agreement’ means any 
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The LLC agreement, whether existing before, at the same time as 
or after the time of filing, may be made effective as of the date of 
the formation of the LLC or such other time as is specified in the 
LLC agreement.189  It is imperative, therefore, that practitioners 
beware of the Delaware statute and make sure that both a 
certificate of formation and an LLC agreement exist before 
allowing clients to transact business in the LLC name. 
In addition to the standard LLC, Delaware offers a “series” 
limited liability company.190  To create a Delaware “series” LLC, the 
certificate of formation must contain a notice of the limitation of 
liability of the series.191  A “series” is, in essence, an allocation by the 
LLC operating agreement of the company’s property, assets or 
obligations, and the profits or losses attendant to the property, 
assets, or obligations so allocated.192  Members, managers, or LLC 
interests may be designated to the series.193  Separate records must 
be maintained for each series so that assets may be identified to a 
single series as well as losses or profits generated by that series.194  If 
the certificate of formation sets forth the mandated notice of series 
and its limitations of liabilities and separate books and accounts are 
maintained for each series, then the debts, obligations, and profits 
of each series remain solely with that series and cannot cross into 
the assets of another series.195  Each series may have a different 
“business purpose or investment objective.”196  A properly formed 
series may “carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity, 
whether or not for profit.”197  In addition, each series may sue or be 
sued in its own name, and has the power and capacity to contract, 
hold title to property (real, personal, or intangible), and grant liens 
 
agreement (whether referred to as a limited liability company agreement, 
operating agreement or otherwise), written, oral or implied, of the member or 
members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its 
business.”). 
 188. Id. (“A limited liability company agreement is not subject to any statute of 
frauds (including § 2714 of this title).”). 
 189. Id. § 18-201(d). 
 190. Id. § 18-215(a) (“A limited liability company agreement may establish or 
provide for the establishment of [one] or more designated series of members, 
managers, limited liability company interests or assets.”). 
 191. Id. § 18-215(b). 
 192. Id. § 18-215(a). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. § 18-215(b). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. § 18-215(a).  
 197. Id. § 18-215(c). 
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and security interests.198 
3. Management of the Delaware LLC 
A Delaware limited liability company does not need to 
designate whether it is member-managed or manager-managed.199  
Under Delaware law, both members and managers retain agency 
authority to bind the LLC whether or not the company is member- 
or manager-managed.200  The operating agreement of the parties 
dictates their rights, including, but not limited to, voting rights, 
profit interests, loss sharing, notices and consents for meeting 
purposes, access to information and confidentiality provisions, and 
exit rights on dissociation, dissolution, termination, or expulsion.201  
In other words, the parties to the company agreement are free to 
contract for whatever provisions each desires.  There is no 
requirement that the parties bargain for “fair” or “equal” terms 
since business issues might dictate that one investor may wish solely 
to “do good” whereas another may wish to generate an internal rate 
of return on her investment.  Each party bargains for its own 
interests.  The Delaware LLC imposes no statutory or judicial 
burden of equality of investment or motive by the contracting 
parties.202  The policy of “freedom of contract” clearly upholds this 
interpretation by the Delaware courts.203  
Further, Delaware courts apply a “plain meaning” 
interpretation to partnership and LLC operating agreements.204  
 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. § 18-402. 
 200. Id.  
 201. See Peter J. Walsh, Jr. & Dominick T. Gattuso, Delaware LLCs: The Wave of 
the Future and Advising Your Clients About What to Expect, 19 BUS. L. TODAY 11, 11 
(2009) (“As business law practitioners know, limited liability companies are 
creatures of contract.  Delaware’s statutory scheme affords members virtually 
unlimited discretion to define the terms of their relationship in the operating 
agreement.”). 
 202. See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market For LLC Law: A Theory of 
Contractability and Legal Indeterminancy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 193 (2011) (noting the 
perception that “heightened contractibility and reduced indeterminacy” makes 
Delaware appear more attractive to incorporating business but also noting that 
these features may actually harm Delaware). 
 203. See Ann E. Conaway, The Multi-Facets of Good Faith in Delaware: A Mistake in 
the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; A Different Partnership Duty of Care; Agency 
Good Faith and Damages; Good Faith and Trust Law, 10 DEL. L. REV. 89, 102–04 
(2008). 
 204. QVT Fund LP v. Eurohypo Capital Funding LLC, C.A. No. 5881-VCP, 
2011 WL 2672092, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2011). 
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Under a plain meaning approach, the Delaware judiciary will not 
admit extrinsic evidence into an unambiguous contract for the 
purpose of rendering it ambiguous.205  The plain meaning 
interpretative guide provides sponsors and investors with the 
needed certainty that negotiated agreements will be upheld despite 
changing market conditions.206  Other jurisdictions, applying a 
“realism” test, permit parol evidence in order to discern intent with 
the result that “realism” courts render the parties’ hard-won 
contractual terms moot.207  In many cases, these courts, espousing 
“realism,” in fact utilize vague tort-based fiduciary duties to fill gaps 
that the parties intended to be left blank or filled by commercially 
reasonable standards.208  Thus, courts that “reform” contracts in the 
name of fiduciary duties are bullwhipping investors with their own 
contract.  Delaware courts, on the other hand, are loath to bind 
parties to terms to which neither party agreed—true freedom from 
contract.209 
4. The Delaware LLC—The Ultimate in Entity Efficiency and 
Investor Flexibility 
Because of its statutory policy of freedom of contract and other 
unique features, the Delaware LLC is unlike almost all United 
States limited liability companies.210  The ability to craft a hybrid 
 
 205. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P. v. GMG Capital Invs., LLC, C.A. No. 
08C-04-084 DCS, 2011 WL 883013, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2011). 
 206. See Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, C.A. No. 5001-VCS, 2010 
WL 2929708, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010). 
 207. See Stephenson v. Oneok Res. Co., 99 P.3d 717, 722–23 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2004) (noting that when an ambiguity is present in a joint operating agreement, 
the jury is entitled to consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity); Smith 
v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 863 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the trial court 
was required to consider parol evidence in determining whether a partnership 
dissolution agreement was fully integrated or not). 
 208. See, e.g., Bishop of Victoria Corp. Sole v. Corp. Bus. Park, 158 P.3d 1183, 
1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 209. See, e.g., QVT Fund LP, 2011 WL 2672092, at *10; Related Westpac LLC, 2010 
WL 2929708, at *1; Athenian Venture Partners, 2011 WL 883013, at *6. 
 210. See generally, Ann E. Conaway, Why No Respect? The Contractual Duties of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing in Delaware, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (June 17, 2007), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=994624## (explaining the 
statutory policy of “freedom of contract” in Delaware unincorporated entity law 
and the confusion of some courts in applying these contractarian principles of 
traditional fiduciary duties).  Georgia, Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and 
Virginia also have “freedom to contract” provisions.  See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-
1107(b), 14-2-920 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(b) (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18, § 2058(D) (2010); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8916(b), 8520(d) (2010); 
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business with a blend of investors with differing financial objectives 
is precisely what is necessary for socially-driven, economically 
responsible organizations.  The Delaware LLC does not require a 
special statute or amendment to an existing statute to accomplish a 
socially beneficial goal.  Also, unlike the B Corporation, the 
Delaware LLC has no mandate that the certificate of formation 
publicly announce its purpose or objectives since neither members 
nor managers have personal liability for the debts or obligations of 
the LLC.211 
The Delaware LLC has the further advantage of its “series” 
provisions.212  If, for example, a renewable energy technology 
business wished to explore solar as well as onshore and offshore 
wind possibilities, each different technology and asset base could 
be allocated to a separate series in order to insulate similar sectors 
or technologies of the business, whether or not they outperform 
another in any given year.  Likewise, if one technology suffered a 
loss due to design failures, the other branches of the business 
would be sheltered from loss by the internal liability shield of the 
series if notice and separate records were properly maintained. 
As noted in the section on the L3C, the standard LLC can 
accomplish everything that the L3C can but without the limitations 
and contradictory applications of fiduciary duties to financially 
adverse investors.213  Delaware has solved the duties issue by 
granting a full complement of investor authority to eliminate or 
limit the application of duties or liability for breach of duties, 
especially where those duties are raised in a nontraditional, 
“stakeholder” setting.214  In essence, Delaware LLC law permits the 
sponsors/founders themselves to determine how best to regulate 
compliance with the “purpose” and “objective” of the social or 
environmental goal of the company as weighted against the 
interests of certain capital investors who seek a simple return on 
their investment.  The LLC operating agreement may set forth: 
standards of compliance; priorities of distributions; asset 
management for third-party beneficiaries; remedies for unhappy 
 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1901 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1282(B) (West 2010); 
Conaway, supra at 3. 
 211. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(d) (2010); Conaway, supra note 210, 
at 7.  
 212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215. 
 213. See supra Part III.D.1, 3. 
 214. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6)–(7); Conaway, supra note 210, at 3 
n.4. 
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parties, including third-party beneficiaries; exit rights for 
disgruntled capital investors; capital call rights; weighted voting 
among classes of stakeholders; or the need, or lack thereof, for a 
“compliance officer” to draft a status report to be circulated to 
stakeholders annually.215 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Social entrepreneurship is an increasing beacon in today’s 
marketplace.  New and existing businesses are seeking to “do 
good,” “give back,” prioritize the human capital of their ventures, 
and generate wealth for investors all at the same time.  Seeking this 
“triple bottom line” is not only good marketing but also good 
business and social stewardship.  What is confusing this sector of 
the U.S. economy is the growth of “niche” entities—the B 
Corporation and the L3C—that serve no economic or financial 
purpose but instead confuse an otherwise overburdened entity-
laden choice of entity feast. 
For example, the B Corporation requires yet another statute to 
overlay “stakeholder” interests onto over one hundred years of the 
fiduciary-driven corporate paradigm.  Yet, “stakeholder 
constituency” statutes already exist for other purposes in many 
jurisdictions.  The B Corporation does not create clarity in the 
arena of social enterprises—just the opposite.  The B Corporation 
sets up the ultimate dichotomy of traditional fiduciary duties owed 
to stockholders under the common law of corporate entities versus 
a new law that inserts “stakeholders” and third-party beneficiaries 
into the corporate common law paradigm.  This confusion is the 
proverbial tip of the iceberg.  Any court interpreting a dispute 
arising from a B Corporation must consider the appropriate 
application of the business judgment rule, equity, and entire 
fairness.  The B Corporation essentially sells investors a lawsuit. 
Likewise, the L3C is confusing and unnecessary.  The L3C 
requires amendments to LLC legislation and accomplishes nothing 
that a standard limited liability company could not achieve.  The 
L3C indeed does greater harm by adding language that seemingly 
tracks federal tax definitions of PRIs, yet the state and federal 
 
 215. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2010).  For general information 
regarding operating agreements, see 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limited Liability Companies § 4 
(2011); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 4:16 (2011).  For an example of an operating 
agreement form, see 12 AM. JUR. 2D Legal Forms § 167A:8 (2011). 
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definitions are not in sync.  Also, compliance with the state 
definition does not guarantee a foundation that its investment will 
receive favorable tax treatment since the PRI must also satisfy the 
foundation’s own internal purposes and objectives.  To the unwary 
and uninitiated, the L3C is misleading and thus harmful to the 
market. 
In the United Kingdom, the limited company may be 
organized for a social and profitable purpose so long as this is 
reflected in the articles of association under the Companies Act 
2006.  The current disadvantage of the limited company is that it 
must adhere to “transparency” requirements, including: public 
filing of internal articles of association, mandatory auditor 
procedures and filings, compliance of insolvency and 
disqualification of directors’ provisions, and other market-related 
provisions.  In addition, the limited company cannot eliminate 
liability for a breach of fiduciary duty or the duty itself.  The only 
“limitation” on a director’s duty is in the nature of the purpose and 
objective of the business.  Thus, if the corporate enterprise is 
defined as being primarily for benefit and secondarily for profit, 
directors are tasked with sorting their duties accordingly.  In many 
cases, these duties will be owed to investors with opposite financial 
interests in the venture.  
Also in the United Kingdom is the limited liability 
partnership—a body corporate.  The disadvantages to the LLP are 
that it requires at least two persons for formation and it retains the 
corporate mandates for transparency and thus public filings for its 
internal operating documents.  Also, the LLP is subject to virtually 
all the filing provisions that apply to a limited company under the 
Companies Act 1985.  In terms of fiduciary duties, like the limited 
company, the LLP cannot eliminate fiduciary duties or liability for 
breaches of fiduciary duties.  However, the articles of association 
for the LLP may “limit” the members’ duties by limiting the 
purpose of the LLP primarily to a beneficial cause with profit 
generation being only a secondary motive.  The members’ duties 
then mirror the purpose/objective of the corporate body.  
However, like the limited company, members are put to the task of 
satisfying investors with diverse financial expectations. 
Clearly, the most investor and market friendly of all entities 
available today for social stewardship and profit return is the 
Delaware limited liability company.  The Delaware LLC comes 
packaged with a state policy of “freedom of contract” that 
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encourages investors, foundations, and sponsors to craft their own 
deal—whatever that deal may be.  The Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act does not impose any statutory fiduciary duties on 
members or managers, but the parties are free to include any 
duties should they desire.  If the parties do not wish to insert 
fiduciary duties, they are free to craft any internal structure they 
wish—whether it is for benefit, for profit, or both.  The LLC may be 
formed as a “series” LLC and the operating agreement may allocate 
property or assets among series and designate members or 
managers to each series as well as profits and losses to those series.  
Each series may have a different business purpose or objective and 
may contract, hold title, and sue or be sued in the series’ name.  
The series may be formed with a single member and may “elect” its 
tax status under the “check-the-box” tax regulations.  Finally, the 
Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery 
together have interpreted more LLC agreements than any other 
jurisdiction.  This judicial predictability in Delaware lowers agency 
costs significantly for a Delaware LLC—more than the formation of 
an LLC in any other U.S. jurisdiction. 
Social entrepreneurship is the trend of the future.  New 
“boutique” legislation is unpredictable and unreliable.  For serious 
social stewards, the global entity of choice is the Delaware LLC. 
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